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Abstract
This paper disentangles the e¤ects of corruption on entry mode decision by car-
rying out an empirical analysis with rich, rm-level data on the activities of Swedish
MNCs around the globe in manufacturing sectors from 1987 to 1998. A number of
propositions emerge from a simple theoretical framework. The panorama of the re-
sults from the empirical part supports most of these propositions: (i). Corruption
has a direct negative impact on greeneld investments and a weak positive impact on
M&As. (ii). There are complex, asymmetric, secondary e¤ects of corruption on the
mode of entry. (iii). International experience dampens the e¤ect of corruption on the
mode of entry.(iv). The results are robust to di¤erences in measures of corruption.
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1 Introduction
While foreign direct investment (FDI) ows have the potential to make signicant con-
tributions to economic and social development, there exist widespread perception and
anecdotal evidence that these ows are often restricted by corrupt practices of local or
national government o¢ cials in di¤erent countries around the globe. In e¤ect corruption
acts as a barrier to entry by multinational corporations (MNCs) into new markets.
Corruption is often dened as the misuse of public power for private benet which
includes bribing of the public o¢ cials, kickbacks in public procurement and the misap-
propriation of public funds. Corruption need not involve money changing hands; it may
be observed in the form of "trading inuences" or granting favors. The level of corruption
has two dimensions: The frequency of corrupt undertakings and the total value of bribes
paid -or the magnitude of inuences traded- which go hand in hand, i.e. in countries
where bribery is the rule of the game, more than a triing proportion of rm revenues
tends to represent the bribes paid.
In 2012, Transparency International conducted a survey on 105 MNCs which are worth
more than $11 trillion. These rms touch the lives of millions of people across the globe.
Of the 105 companies surveyed in the TI report, 50 do not disclose revenue/sales in any
country of foreign operations, 85 do not disclose income tax in any country of foreign
operations and 39 do not disclose any nancial data (tax, revenue, sales, pre-tax income,
capital investment, community contributions) in their countries of operation. Under these
circumstances, it becomes absolutely necessary to rethink the e¤ects of corruption not only
on the national rms, but also on the FDI ows channeled through di¤erent modes of
entry with mode-specic consequences for the countries hosting considerable amounts of
FDI.
MNCs undertake foreign direct investment in di¤erent ways: Cross-border M&As,
greeneld investments, joint ventures, partial acquisitions, and di¤erent forms of low-
equity commitment such as sales o¢ ces, licensing, research centers, etc.1 Except for a
few recent studies, trade literature has considered the e¤ects of corruption mainly in the
context of whether or not to produce overseas, but has not di¤erentiated specic types
of FDI and therefore treated the di¤erent entry modes as perfect substitutes. However,
for most rms seeking foreign market access, cross-border acquisitions and greeneld
investments represent unlikely candidates for perfect substitution. While acquisitions
provide rapid access to a foreign market with increased market power and a means of
exploiting synergies -derived from the non-mobile skills such as knowledge of the local
conditions- between buyer and seller rms, greeneld investments o¤er the most protable
internal utilization of mobile rm-specic assets (R&D, marketing expenditures, scientic
and technical workers, product newness and complexity and product di¤erentiation) for
reasons including moral hazard and technology di¤usion.
There has been a systematic work on the e¤ects of corruption on FDI ows using
1Due to lack of data, the middle ground between wholly owned operations and no entry could not be
included in the analysis in this paper.
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aggregate data as explained in the next section. However, exploration of corruptions
e¤ect on FDI using rm level data is much rarer due to the lack of systematic data on
corruption and scarcity and condentiality of rm-level data on FDI until recently.
The objective of this paper is to add to this newly developing literature by o¤ering a
theoretical analysis that takes into consideration not just how corruption may restrict FDI
ows, but also how corruption may facilitate these ows and then testing the ndings of
the theory on-site in Sweden by employing rich, rm-level data on the activities of Swedish
MNCs around the globe in manufacturing sectors from 1987 to 1998.
First, I o¤er a simple theoretical framework to motivate the empirical analysis. Six
propositions are generated. The rst two are related to the direct (primary) e¤ect of
corruption on the mode of foreign expansion: (i) Higher levels of corruption discourage
greeneld investments and (ii) under certain circumstances encourage cross-border M&As.
The last four propositions and their corollaries address the indirect (secondary) e¤ects:
(iii) MNCs with higher endowments of mobile skills are more likely to invest in the host
country. This likelihood is dampened the higher the degree of corruption in the host
country. The dampening e¤ect is stronger for M&As than greeneld investments. (iv)
MNCs with higher endowments of non-mobile skills are more likely to invest in the host
country. This likelihood is magnied the higher the degree of corruption in the host
country. The magnication is stronger for M&As than greeneld investments.
Main innovations present in the empirical part are as follows: First, I include both
foreign access strategies (cross-border M&As and greeneld investments) in the analysis,
which di¤ers from many studies that include one of the strategies at a time. Second, I
consider not only the direct e¤ects of corruption on the modes of foreign expansion but
also the indirect e¤ects by allowing the corruption tolerance of a MNC vary with its skill
set. Third, I apply the bivariate probit model to account for the correlation between
di¤erent entry strategies, which reduces the inconsistency of the estimators signicantly.
Results of the empirical analysis show that corruption reduces the likelihood of foreign
entry as conjectured by recent studies. Entry mode decision of an MNC is a complex one
and there are many asymmetries involved when it comes to the impact of corruption
on this decision. First, greeneld investments are always discouraged by higher levels of
corruption. This is more so for rms with high levels of mobile skills. Second, M&As are
encouraged by moderate levels of corruption. For rms with high levels of non-mobile skills
this e¤ect is stronger. However, when corruption levels are beyond a certain threshold,
M&As are deterred as well. Third, rms with a wider network of foreign a¢ liates are
more immune to the e¤ects of corruption, whereas small, single a¢ liate rms are severely
a¤ected. These results conrm the ndings of the recent literature and add to it by testing
a number of extensions of this view.
The paper continues as follows: In the next section, I present the related recent
literature. In Section 3, I lay out a simple model and present the testable propositions
generated from it. In section 4, I discuss the econometric analysis. Sections 5 reports the
results and I conclude in Section 6.
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2 The recent literature
There are two strands of literature that are relevant to the analysis of corruption and
entry modes of multinational corporations. The rst one is the literature on foreign
direct investment, too vast to be addressed here at length (Markusen (2002) and citations
therein). The second line of literature relevant for this paper is voluminous as well and
considers the causes and consequences of corruption in general. The work spans many
di¤erent areas such as the impact of corruption on regulatory discretion, existence of rents
and opportunities for rent-seeking, and civil service wage policy. There are also studies
that consider the impact of corruption on various aspects of economic systems such as
growth, military expenditure and procurement, delivery of public services, and inequality.
Excellent surveys of this literature are provided by Jain (2001) and Aidt (2003).
There is a fast growing literature on corruption and FDI connection. The existing
work is mostly empirical and can be summarized under two headings: (i). Corruption
acting as the "grabbing hand" in FDI: Corruption in a host country introduces additional
direct or indirect costs for the foreign investor and therefore makes FDI less likely. This
argument nds support in the works of Hines (1995), Wei (2000a, 2000b), Hellman et al.
(2002), Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Busse and Hefeker (2007), Hakkala et al. (2008)
and Javorcik and Wei (2009). (ii). Corruption acting as the "helping hand" in FDI:
By greasing squeaky wheels of an ine¢ cient bureaucracy and softening rigid regulations,
corruption can reduce the obstacles in front of FDI and thus will not necessarily discourage
it. The works of Lui (1985), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Saha (2001), Egger and Winner
(2005), Bjorvatn and Soreide (2005), Wu (2006), Tekin-Koru (2006) and Barassi and Zhou
(2012) are examples of this line of study.
The current paper builds on this earlier empirical work examining the e¤ects of cor-
ruption on FDI. Many of these studies use aggregate cross-country data. The fewer ones
using rm-level data usually take steps beyond investigating the e¤ect of corruption on
FDI. Some concentrate of the ownership structure of the rm and some on the di¤erent
types of a¢ liate activity in host country and how they are a¤ected by corruption in the
host country or by the corruption distance between the parent and host countries. Two
such recent studies which are more relevant for the current paper are contributions made
by Javorcik and Wei (2009) and Hakkala, Norbäck and Svaleryd (2008).
Javorcik andWei (2009) investigate how the volume of FDI and its ownership structure
may be a¤ected by the extent of corruption. They use rm-level data from 22 transition
economies and nd that corruption adversely a¤ects the probability of foreign investments
taking place in the host country. However, conditional on FDI taking place, their results
suggest that joint ventures are more likely in corrupt environments unless the technological
sophistication of the foreign rm is high. Di¤erent from Javorcik and Wei (2009) who
bundle acquisitions and greeneld investments together as sole ownership, in the current
paper I treat them di¤erently since the motives for undertaking an M&A and a greeneld
investment are not the same. Moreover, in the current paper data on global operations of
Swedish multinational rms are used which provides a broader coverage of host countries.
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The most relevant work for the current paper is by Hakkala et al. (2008) who consider
the impact of corruption on FDI in two dimensions: (i) corruption may inuence the
probability that a rm chooses to invest in a foreign market but not the size of the a¢ liate
activities once the investment is undertaken, and (ii) corruption may have di¤erent e¤ects
on di¤erent types of a¢ liate activities such as horizontal, vertical or export platform sales.
Using Swedish rm-level data, Hakkala et al. nd that Swedish MNCs are less likely to
invest in corrupt countries. In their detailed analysis, horizontal investments are deterred
by high levels of corruption, however, there is no robust e¤ect of corruption on vertical
or export platform sales. This asymmetry is explained by greater costs incurred by the
rm in case of production for local sales rather than production for exporting to other
markets. They also nd that R&D intensive or large rms weather corruption better
compared to less technical or smaller rms. The current paper complements Hakkala et
al. (2008) by using the same Swedish multinational rm data to examine another aspect
of FDI, namely the e¤ect of corruption on M&As and greeneld investments.
3 Corruption and foreign entry - A theoretical framework
This section presents a model of the e¤ects of corruption in countries on the choice of FDI,
the mode-selection of FDI, and on the levels of FDI. Section 3.1 lays out the assumptions,
followed by a sequential entry game involving Nash-Bargaining in Section 3.2. Finally,
the complex e¤ects of host country corruption levels on FDI decisions of the MNCs are
explored in Section 3.3.
3.1 Assumptions
A MNC from the parent country (P ) considers entering the host country market, (H).
It can choose between building its own establishment (greeneld investments, g) or to
acquire an already existing indigenous rm (mergers and acquisition (M&A), m). The
outside alternative for the MNC is not to enter at all (n). Thus,  = fm; g; ng represents
the set of possible entry strategies (s). I assume, for the sake of simplicity, that exporting
to H is not a feasible option due to transport cost reasons.2
Preferences. There exist two nal goods sectors; X (increasing returns, imperfect
competition) and Y (constant returns, perfect competition). Good Y is produced from
a single factor L (Labor), where one unit of L produces one unit of Y . Good X, on the
other hand, is produced using rm specic assets and factor L, both in xed proportions.
The linear demand functions are derived from the quasi-linear utility function maximized
subject to a budget constraint. Income is derived from labor and prots.
maxU = X  


2

X2 + Y (1)
subject to L+  = Y + pX
2The model could be broadened in such a way that the rms choice extends to serving country H by
exporting, which does not alter the principal insights. See Tekin-Koru (2012) for a model with exporting
as as an alternate way of serving the potential host country.
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where L and Y are numéraires. The inverse demand function for good X is as follows:
P =   X (2)
Firms. I assume that there are two (potential) rms producing X in country H, one
from parent country p and one indigenous to host country h.
Firms di¤er in their skills. As in Nocke and Yeaple (2004) there are two types of
rm-specic skills: mobile () and non-mobile (). The e¢ ciency of a rms production
technology is assumed to travel internationally at little to no cost. On the other hand,
the degree of familiarity with the local business conditions is assumed immobile. These
non-mobile skills, including but not limited to the degree of inuence on political process
and of the strength of ties with local bureaucracy, marketing strategies geared towards
the expectations of the host country and greater access to distribution channels a¤ect
both marginal production costs and the xed entry costs as does the level of corruption
() in country H. Variable production costs of rms p and h are given by cp and ch:
cp(s) =

c(p; p; ) if s = g
c(p; h; ) if s = m
(3)
ch(s) = c(h; h; ) for all s (4)
Due to investment in R&D and long term diverse experience in managerial practice,
which are internationally mobile, rm p is endowed with an alternative technology which
allows it to have greater cost advantages in producing good x compared to rm h in cases
of both M&As and greeneld investments. On the other hand, if greeneld investment
is the chosen mode of entry, then rm h enjoys greater cost savings due to being better
acquainted with the local business conditions. Since rm p has access to the non-mobile
skills of the indigenous rm (h) in an M&A regime, the size of the cost savings is as
big as the ones enjoyed by rm h in greeneld and no entry regimes. Higher levels of
corruption () in country H will increase the variable costs of production at an increasing
rate. In countries with widespread corruption, for example, the variable costs may reach
prohibitively high levels.3
I also consider the interactions of rm-specic skills with the level of corruption in
country H. I assume that high degrees of mobile skills make the MNCs less corruption
tolerant. Thursby and Thursby (2006) in their study of more than 200 multinational
companies across 15 industries, mostly headquartered in the United States and Western
Europe, nd that only 22 percent of the R&D e¤ort in emerging countries is for new
science. In other words, companies keep their most cutting-edge research in developed
countries where intellectual property protection is the strongest. Therefore, one can argue
that mobile skills get less benecial for the rm as corruption increases.4
3The variable productions costs are concave in both mobile () and immobile skills () and convex in
the level of corruption (): @c
@p
< @c
@h
< 0; @c
@h
< @c
@p
< 0; @c
@
> 0 and @
2c
@2p
= @
2c
@2
h
< 0; @
2c
@2
h
= @
2c
@2p
< 0;
@2c
@2
> 0
Moreover, the variable production costs are assumed to be submodular in their arguments.
4The cross derivatives of cost functions with respect to mobile skills and the level of corruption are as
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On the other hand, rms may adopt a "when in Rome, do as Romans do" strategy
in their foreign operations. This can translate into non-mobile skills, such as local con-
nections, becoming much more valuable in the existence of corruption. There are many
anecdotes to the e¤ect. When Candy, the Italian home appliances manufacturer, decided
to expand into Russia in 2005 and open the companys rst plant there, the company
had to deal with extreme di¢ culties for the companys trucks to even make it across the
border. After struggling with the problem for weeks, Candy decided to set up a division
of the company in Moscow that would have the sole responsibility of dealing with customs
clearance. The problem was solved in days. Another high-prole example is the recent
scandal of GlaxoSmithKline, the British drug giant, which involves using bribes, kickbacks
and other fraudulent means by the Chinese executives of the company to bolster drug
sales in China over 2007-2013 period. Therefore, in the light of these anecdotal evidence,
it may not be wrong to assume that high degrees of non-mobile skills make the MNCs
more corruption tolerant.5
In addition to the variable costs, the multinational rm incurs xed entry costs as well.
First, there is a xed greeneld establishment cost (F (g)). Second, there is an M&A cost
(F (m)) if the indigenous rm is acquired.
Last but not least, there is a bureaucratic cost of entry (F b(s) = F b(i; ) for i =
fh; pg) in the host country, H. This cost, F b essentially measures the procedures, time,
cost and paid-in minimum capital required for a rm to start-up and formally operate
in the host country. The regulation of entry enables the regulators to collect bribes
from the potential entrants and serves no social purpose. Therefore, in the model, it is
assumed that F b increases in corruption. More extensive regulation should be associated
with socially inferior outcomes, particularly corruption. Djankov et. al. (2002) nds
evidence supporting the public choice view that entry regulation benets politicians and
bureaucrats. Since it is possible to avoid some if not all of these barriers, a higher degree
of familiarity with the local business/governance conditions will help reducing these costs
by itself and will do even more so in more corrupt environments.6
3.2 The game
Firm p maximizes its prots in the host country through its choice of entry mode and the
quantity supplied.7 In the rst stage, the MNC chooses its entry mode and in the second
stage makes its quantity decision in a usual Cournot setting by taking the entry mode
from the previous stage as given.
follows: @
2c
@p@
> 0; @
2c
@h@
> 0:
5The cross derivatives of cost functions with respect to non-mobile skills and the level of corruption
are as follows: @
2c
@h@
< 0; @
2c
@p@
< 0:
6The o¢ cial costs of entry are concave in immobile skills () and convex in the level of corruption ():
@F b
@h
< @F
b
@p
< 0; @F
b
@
> 0 and @
2F b
@2
h
= @
2F b
@2p
> 0; @
2F b
@2
> 0: The cross derivatives @
2F b
@h@
and @
2F b
@p@
are
negative by the same logic used in variable costs.
7This paper explores the prot maximization of rm p in the host country in isolation and does not
take into account the multinationals prot maximization neither in the parent country and nor in its
broader worldwide network due to the much needed simplicity in this highly non-linear model.
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A strategy for rm p has two elements: (i): the rms entry mode choice, s 2  where
 = fm; g; ng is the set of all possible entry nodes and (ii): the rms quantity choice,
xp(s) where xp(s) > 0 indicates that rm p is active in the host country; xp(s) = 0
indicates that rm p chooses n and thus not to produce in country H.
Aggregate supply to the consumers by rms i = fh; pg in the host country given the
entry mode choice s; is:
X(s) =
X
i
xi(s); i = fh; pg (5)
and the aggregate prots generated under each entry strategy s for rms p and h in
country H are given by
p(s; xp(s)) = [(P   cp(s))xp(s)]  F (s)  F b(s) = p(s; xp(s))  F (s)  F b(s) (6)
h(s; xh(s)) = [(P   ch(s))xh(s)] = h(s; xh(s))
where xi(s); ci(s); F (s) and F b(s) are the quantity choice, variable cost of production for
each rm i, xed costs associated with each entry mode s and bureaucratic costs of entry.
i signies the operating prots of rm i = fh; pg. The M&A cost F (m) is endogenized
through a simple bilateral Nash bargaining process.
Bargaining. In this game, the acquiring rm (rm p) and the target rm (rm h)
seek to split a total value p(m) F b(m) which they can achieve if and only if they agree
on a specic division. If there is no agreement between rm h and rm p, the latter opts
for the next best alternative among no entry and greeneld investment. The following
payo¤s, thus, can be called backstop payo¤s and be signied by a tilda:
ep = max fp(g);p(n)g (7)eh = maxnh(g) jep=p(g);h(n) jep=p(n)o
For the solution of this bargaining procedure, it should be assumed that there is a
positive surplus (p(m)   F b(m)   ep   eh > 0) from agreement. If this were not the
case, the whole bargaining process would be unlikely because each side would just take
up its outside opportunity and receives its backstop payo¤. Next, consider the following
rule coming from the solution of bilateral Nash-bargaining process.
Criterion 1 Given  2 [0; 1] each party is to be given its backstop payo¤ plus a share of
the surplus, a fraction  for rm p and a fraction (1  ) for rm h.
All bargaining scenarios have two things in common: There is always a surplus after
reaching an agreement and it is not a zero-sum game. This is true for the multinational
and the local rm as well. First, if the total payo¤ from an M&A is not greater than the
status quo neither the MNC nor the local rm will engage in such fruitless negotiations;
ergo there is a surplus. Second, even though both the MNC and the local rm try to
get more for themselves and leave less for the other party, if no agreement is reached no
one will get any surplus at all, therefore, both sides win when an agreement is reached.
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The above stated criterion formalizes these two issues to have a solution to the Nashs
cooperative game approach to bargaining.
Writing p(m) and h(m) for the amounts that rm p and rm h receive, the above
stated bargaining criterion can be translated as
p(m) = ep + (p(m)  F b(m)  ep   eh) = p(m)  F b(m)  F (m) (8)
h(m) = eh + (1  )(p(m)  F b(m)  ep   eh) = F (m)
Next, dene the reservation price of the buying party as Rp = p(m)   F b(m)   ep
and that of the selling party as Rh = eh. The reservation price of the multinational is
the prots of the multinational after the M&A minus its next best alternative, i.e. the
maximum of its greeneld or no entry. The reservation price of the local rm is the local
rms prots if no agreement is reached. Then, one can arrive at the cost of M&A by
solving the equations in (7) for F (m):
F (m) = (1  )Rp + Rh (9)
When  = 1; rm p has all the bargaining power implying that F (m) = Rh: When
 = 0; on the other hand rm p has no bargaining power and thus the cross-border M&A
price is the same as its reservation price, i.e. F (m) = Rp:
Equilibrium. The game is solved in the usual logic of backward induction. I seek
the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. The second stage of the game involves
the product market where rms compete á la Cournot. The equilibrium output levels
and total prots of all rms are reported in the Appendix. Production and sales take
place with rms moving simultaneously. The game is solved for Nash equilibria in pure
strategies. Each equilibrium point is assumed to have equal probability.
Criterion 2 Denote by Xp(s) the set of possible quantity choices for form p in the host
country market given entry mode choice s: The Nash equilibrium for the second-stage
quantity sub-game for any s is the quantity choice xp(s) such that:
p(s; x

p(s))  h(s; xp(s); x p (s)) for all xp(s) 2 Xp(s) (10)
Denote by p(s) the prot to rm p from the Nash equilibrium quantity choice
corresponding to the entry mode choice s: An equilibrium for the rst-stage entry game is
an entry strategy s such that:
p(s
)  p(s; s ) for all s 2  (11)
The MNC makes its entry decision in the following way. In the case where the best
alternative to a negotiated agreement is no entry, rm p chooses cross-border M&A over no
entry if the payo¤ from cross-border M&A is higher than zero. On the other hand, in the
case where the best alternative is greeneld investment, rm p chooses cross-border M&A
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if the payo¤ from M&A is higher than that from greeneld investment. The nal decision
in regard to entry mode, henceforth, will be the outcome of the relative magnitudes
of and the interrelations among country size, level of corruption in the country, rms
relative endowments of mobile and immobile skills, and the relative bargaining power of
the parties.
Considering the current setup of the model, it would be natural to expect a negative
impact of host country corruption on the FDI modes of entry. In other words, as the
corruption level of the host country increases both the variable production costs and
initial start-up costs will get higher and thus discourage the MNC from investing in
the host country all together. However, this argument ignores both the changes in the
acquisition price -which is endogenized in this model- with respect to changes in corruption
and the importance of the MNCs relative endowment of mobile and non-mobile skills.
The corruption tolerance -how well the rm copes with the potential negative impact of
corruption on protability- of a MNC with high levels of mobile skills will be quiet low
compared to a MNC endowed with not to so strong mobile skills but with impressive levels
of non-mobile skills. Therefore, to formalize this discussion I use comparative statics in
the next section.
3.3 Comparative statics
In this section, I analyze the e¤ects of corruption on the entry mode decision of a multi-
national rm to generate testable hypotheses.
3.3.1 Corruption
What is the impact of host country corruption on the equilibrium patterns of greeneld
investments, M&As and no entry at all? To answer this question, I compare the e¤ects of
corruption level () in country H on the payo¤s of rm p from di¤erent entry strategies.
For notational convenience I will henceforth use p(s) for p(s; xp(s)). Before the
total derivative of p(s) for 8s 2  with respect to  is calculated two cases should
be di¤erentiated: The case where greeneld investment is the next best alternative to
M&A and the case where no entry is the next best. The latter is trivial as both variable
production costs and bureaucratic costs of entry will be higher for higher corruption levels.
Therefore, I continue with the more complex case where greeneld investment is the next
best alternative to M&A.
Proposition 1 More corruption in the host country reduces the likelihood of greeneld
investments.
Proof. The payo¤ from greeneld investment to rm p is
p(g) = p(m)  F b(g)  F (g) (12)
First, take the total derivative of p(g) with respect to  and then substitute the explicit
forms of the payo¤ functions given in Appendix in the general form equations. Finally by
9
applying the assumption that @cp@ =
@ch
@ ; arrive at
dp(g)
d
=   2
3
@cp
@
  @F
b(g)
@
(13)
Given that @F
b(s)
@ > 0 and
@cp
@ > 0 for s 2 fm; gg the above derivative is negative.
In this model, greeneld investments are a¤ected by host country corruption through
operating costs and bureaucratic costs of entry. As the level of corruption in the host
country increases, MNCs prots from a greeneld investment project decline due to rising
operating costs (e.g., costs of dealing with red-tape in day-to-day activities) and rising
start-up costs (e.g., long waiting times for permits). This in turn reduces the payo¤ and
eventually the likelihood of greeneld investments in corrupt host countries. This result
is in line with the existing literature on the e¤ects of corruption on FDI. Next, consider
the M&A case.
Proposition 2 More corruption in the host country (i) reduces the likelihood of M&As
when the degree of corruption is low; (ii) increases the likelihood of M&As when the degree
of corruption is high.
Proof. The payo¤ from M&A to rm p is given by
p(m) = p(m)  F b(m)  F (m) (14)
where F (m) = (1  )[p(m)  F b(m) p(g)] + h(g)
Notice that the cost of acquisition is determined by the other parameters of the model.
Take the total derivative of p(m) with respect to 
dp(m)
d
= 
dp(m)
d
+ (1  )dp(g)
d
  dh(g)
d
  @F
b(m)
@
(15)
Given the Cournot prots from the Appendix, it is trivial to nd that dp(m)d =  xp(m) @cp@ <
0 since @cp(m)@ > 0. The second term,
dp(g)
d < 0 as proven above. The third term,
dh(g)
d =  2xh(m)3 @ch@ < 0 since @ch(g)@ > 0. The last term, @F
b(m)
@ > 0:
(i). If
dh(g)d  is su¢ ciently small, then the derivative in equation (15) becomes
negative.
(ii.) If
dh(g)d  is su¢ ciently large, then the derivative in equation (15) becomes
positive.
While there is a monotonically decreasing relationship between corruption in the host
country and the likelihood of greeneld investments, this relationship becomes non-linear
(U-shaped) for M&As. This stems from the assumption that the indigenous rm is also
hurt by corruption and it works to the advantage of the MNC by reducing the acquisition
price. In relatively less corrupt environments, the existing local rms are hurt less by
corruption and this causes a discount in the M&A prices at a lesser degree. However, in
highly corrupt environments, the damage caused by corruption on the prots of the local
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rm is high and this translates into a large price reduction in M&A negotiations. This
price reduction then becomes the dominant factor and corruption increases the likelihood
of M&As compared to the greeneld investments.
3.3.2 Corruption and mobile skills
I now turn to the issue that how the corruption tolerance of rm p changes as the level of
mobile skills (p) change. Specically, how does the equilibrium pattern changes when the
interaction of the mobile skills with the level of corruption is considered? As stated earlier,
mobile skills provide production cost advantages to the MNC. However, the marginal
impact of these skills gets lower in the existence of rising corruption levels for reasons
such as poor intellectual property right (IPR) protection.
Proposition 3 MNCs with higher endowments of mobile skills are more likely to conduct
greeneld investments. This likelihood is dampened the higher the degree of corruption in
the host country.
Proof. From the assumption that @c@p < 0, the proof of the rst part of the proposition
is trivial.
For the second statement, consider the cross derivative of p(g) given in equation (12)
with respect to p and  :
d2p(g)
dpd
=
4
92
@cp
@p
@cp
@
  4
3
xp(g)
@2cp
@p@
(16)
Given that @cp@p < 0 and
@cp
@ > 0 and
@2cp
@p@
> 0; the above derivative is negative.
Higher endowment of mobile skills give the MNC an advantage over local rms and
thus guarantees a higher market share. Therefore, independent of the degree of cor-
ruption, mobile skills such as technological know-how or managerial ability increase the
prots of the MNC in the host country. However, as the degree of corruption in the host
country increases the usefulness of such skills deteriorate due to poor IPR protection or
bureaucratic red-tape. Therefore, it is likely that MNCs with high levels of mobile skills
may avoid investing in highly corrupt environments in the form of greeneld investments.
Proposition 4 MNCs with higher endowments of mobile skills are more likely to conduct
M&As. This likelihood is dampened the higher the degree of corruption in the host country.
Proof. From the assumption that @c@p <
@c
@h
< 0, the proof of the rst part of the
proposition is trivial.
For the second statement, consider the derivative of dp(m)d given in equation (15)
with respect to p. To derive an expression for it, consider the components of equation
(15) one by one. The derivative of the rst component dp(m)d with respect to p is
d2p(m)
dpd
=
2
32
@cp
@p
@cp
@
  1

xp(m)
@2cp
@p@
(17)
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which is negative as @cp@p < 0,
@cp
@ > 0 and
@2cp
@p@
> 0. The derivative of the second
component is already given in equation (16) which is proven to be negative. Next, consider
the derivative of dh(g)d with respect to p
d2h(g)
dpd
=   2
92
@cp
@p
@cp
@
+
2
3
xh(g)
@2cp
@p@
(18)
which is positive as @cp@p < 0,
@cp
@ > 0 and
@2cp
@p@
> 0. When all of the components are put
together
d2p(m)
dpd
=
4
92
@cp
@p
@cp
@
(1 + )  1

@2cp
@p@

xp(m) +
2
3
xh(g) + (1  )xp(g)

(19)
Given that @cp@p < 0 and
@cp
@ > 0 and
@2cp
@p@
> 0; the derivative in equation (19) is negative.
Corollary 1 The dampening e¤ect is stronger for M&As than greeneld investments as
long as the MNC has less bargaining power.
Using the payo¤ functions in the Appendix, one can easily prove that d
2p(m)
dpd
<
d2p(g)
dpd
if  < 12 and xi(s) where i = (p; hg.
In more corrupt environments, increases in both greeneld and M&A prots due to
higher endowments of mobile skills will be lower than what they would be for lesser
amounts of corruption. While mobile skills provide variable cost savings for rm p; in-
creasing levels of corruption dampens the e¤ectiveness of these cost savings. This in turn
implies an advantage for the indigenous rm, which will exploit it at the negotiation table
by demanding a higher acquisition price. Therefore, in case of an M&A, rm p will be
hurt due to reduced e¤ectiveness of its mobile skills coupled with an increase in the M&A
entry cost. Moreover, if the MNC has a lower bargaining strength than the local rm,
then this e¤ect gets amplied.
3.3.3 Corruption and non-mobile skills
The analysis so far has highlighted the importance of increasing levels of corruption and
the cross e¤ects with mobile skills. I now investigate how the degree of non-mobile skills
endowment with increasing levels of corruption a¤ect the equilibrium mode of entry.
Proposition 5 MNCs with higher endowments of non-mobile skills are more likely to
conduct greeneld investments. This likelihood is magnied the higher the degree of cor-
ruption in the host country.
Proof. From the assumption that @c@p < 0, the proof of the rst part of the proposition
is trivial.
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For the second statement, consider the cross derivative of p(g) given in equation (12)
with respect to p and  :
d2p(g)
dpd
=
4
92
@cp
@p
@cp
@
  4
3
xp(g)
@2cp
@p@
  @
2F b(g)
@p@
(20)
Note that @cp@p < 0 and
@cp
@ > 0 and
@2cp
@p@
< 0 and @
2F b(g)
@p@
< 0. Since cp is assumed to be
submodular in its arguments,
 @2cp@p@  >  @cp@p @cp@ , the above derivative is positive.
Submodularity here means that the benecial e¤ect of non-mobile skills in corrupt
environments is magnied compared to the direct positive e¤ect of non-mobile skills or
direct negative impact of corruption on rm prots. Higher endowment of non-mobile
skills, in other words familiarity with local business conditions, increases the prots of
the MNC in the host country. However, as the degree of corruption in the host country
increases, such skills become more valuable because rms adopt a "when in Rome, do as
Romans do" strategy in their foreign operations. Therefore, it is likely that MNCs with
high levels of non-mobile skills may avoid investing in highly corrupt environments in the
form of greeneld investments.
Proposition 6 MNCs with higher endowments of non-mobile skills are more likely to
conduct M&As. This likelihood is magnied the higher the degree of corruption in the
host country.
Proof. From the assumption that @c@p <
@c
@h
< 0, the proof of the rst part of the
proposition is trivial.
For the second statement, consider the derivative of dp(m)d given in equation (15)
with respect to p = h. Since rm p buys rm h, it adopts rm hs superior non-mobile
skills. To derive an expression for it, examine the components of equation (15) one by
one. The derivative of the rst component dp(m)d with respect to p is
d2p(m)
dpd

p=h
=
2
32
@cp
@h
@cp
@
  1

xp(m)
@2cp
@h@
(21)
As long as cp in its arguments the above derivative is positive. The derivative of the
second component is already given in equation (20) which is proven to be negative. Next,
consider the derivative of dh(g)d
d2h(g)
dpd

p=h
=   2
92
@cp
@p
@cp
@
+
2
3
xh(g)
@2cp
@p@
(22)
As long as cp in its arguments the above derivative is positive. When all of the components
are put together
d2p(m)
dpd

p=h
=
4
92
@cp
@h
@cp
@
(1 + )  1

@2cp
@h@

xp(m) +
2
3
xh(g) + (1  )xp(g)

(23)
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Note that @cp@h < 0 and
@cp
@ > 0 and
@2cp
@h@
< 0. Since cp is assumed to be submodular in
its arguments,
 @2cp@p@  >  @cp@p @cp@ , the derivative in equation (23) is positive.
Corollary 2 The magnication is stronger for M&As than greeneld investments as long
as the MNC has more bargaining power.
Using the payo¤ functions in the Appendix, one can easily prove that d
2p(m)
dhd
>
d2p(g)
dhd
if  > 12 and xi(s) where i = (p; hg.
In an M&A what rm p buys is the non-mobile skills () of the indigenous rm as
well. These skills a¤ect both marginal production costs and the xed entry costs as does
the level of corruption () in country H. These skills become more valuable in corrupt
environments. If the discrepancy between the non-mobile skills of the MNC and that of
the indigenous rm is very high, then the acquisition price will be higher, too. Therefore,
if the bargaining strength of the MNC is high, then the multinational can negotiate a
price lower than the reservation price of the indigenous rm and at the same time can
make higher prots by using the newly earned superior nonmobile skills in an M&A
scenario.
In a way, it is the relative rates of corruption tolerance between these rms which
determines the equilibrium mode of entry. For instance, if the corruption tolerance of
rm p is very high due to superior mobile skills and if it couples with low levels of non-
mobile skill endowments, then the indigenous rm can enjoy a greater advantage. It might
as well be the case that the indigenous rm has all the "right" contacts with the local
bureaucracy and it is going to be costly for the MNC to buy these non-mobile skills. If
the indigenous rm happen to have a high bargaining strength then it might prevent the
entry of the MNC all together and stay as the national monopoly.
In summary, as corruption increases multinational entry gets discouraged. However,
passed a certain threshold, corruption may induce more M&As. Moreover, when the
importance of skill endowments is considered, multinational rms with rich mobile and
non-mobile skills would prefer greeneld investments in corrupt environments. MNCs
with low levels of mobile and non-mobile skills would prefer no entry. Multinationals
with high levels of mobile, but low levels of non-mobile skills would prefer M&A if the
bargaining strength is high. Otherwise, they would go with the greeneld choice or no
entry.
The results of this section lend themselves to empirical testing and I now turn to a
discussion of the empirical analysis and the data set.
4 Econometric analysis
The theoretical framework presented in the previous section suggests that corruption in
a host country can have asymmetric e¤ects on di¤erent ways of serving a foreign market.
The following econometric analysis provides the impact of corruption on foreign entry
modes by using a sample of Swedish multinational rms.
14
4.1 Econometric model
Propositions 1 and 2 in the previous section state that corruption in the host country has
asymmetric e¤ects on a multinationals mode of foreign expansion. While greeneld in-
vestments decline with higher levels of corruption, cross-border M&As can be encouraged
under certain circumstances. I use the following specication to test these predictions:
yikt;s = 0;s + 1;skt + 
0
2;sxit + 
0
3;sxkt + "ikt;s (24)
where yikt;s is a binary indicator if rm is entry into country k during time period t in
the form of s 2 fm; g; ng, kt denotes corruption, xit is a vector of rm-specic variables
(including mobile skills it; non-mobile skills it; bargaining strength it) and xkt is a
vector of country-specic variables (including variable production costs ckt; market size
kt). I also include time and industry xed e¤ects in all specications to account for the
e¤ect of unobservables. Due to data limitations of industry-specic variables for di¤erent
countries, the regressions have no such variables.
Propositions 3 through 6 and their corollaries involve more complex, secondary e¤ects
of corruption on mode of foreign entry decision which act through mobile and non-mobile
skill endowments of the multinational rm. To test the predictions of the model I use
marginal e¤ects calculations, which will be discussed in detail below.
The most appropriate econometric method to use would be the nested logit model
since the MNC rst gures out the next best alternative to a negotiated agreement and
then enters. However, due to lack of choice specic attributes in the data, the nested
logit model becomes useless. Therefore, the empirical part of the paper adopts the most
general setting where the rm decides if and how to enter.
In this paper, the bivariate probit model is the main method used. This model is
useful in providing the marginal e¤ects for each entry strategy. First, I estimate e¤ects
of corruption on FDI (M&A and greeneld together) versus no entry, because it would
provide a useful comparison to some of the existing literature that does not take di¤erent
entry modes into account. When the bivariate probit is used for the choice between FDI
and no entry, there are two equations (one for FDI and one for no entry) and two binary
dependent variables, yikt;fdi (1 if there is FDI and 0 otherwise) and yikt;n (1 if there is no
entry and 0 otherwise). If the MNC chooses FDI, then yikt;fdi = 1 and yikt;n = 0. If the
MNC chooses not to enter the host market, then yikt;fdi = 0 and yikt;n = 1.
Then, bivariate probit estimates of e¤ects of corruption on new entry by Swedish multi-
nationals through cross-border M&As and greeneld investments are estimated. Once
more, there are two equations (one for M&As and one for greeneld investments) and two
binary dependent variables, yikt;m (1 if there is an M&A and 0 otherwise) and yikt;g.(1
if there is a greeneld investment and 0 otherwise). If the MNC chooses M&A, then
yikt;m = 1 and yikt;g = 0. If the MNC chooses greeneld investment, then yikt;m = 0 and
yikt;g = 1.
Error terms "ikt;s are distributed as bivariate normal, each with a mean of zero, and
variance-covariance matrix V , where V has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and corre-
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lations  as o¤-diagonal elements. The bivariate probit model shows structural similarities
to a seemingly unrelated regression model, except that the dependent variables are binary
indicators.
The LR test is used to test the independence of residuals to explore the existence of
nesting possibilities if any.
4.2 The dependent variable
This section provides detailed information on the dependent variable. The data set used
in the paper covers information on the cross-border activities of Swedish MNCs in 42
countries during three distinct time periods: 1987-90, 1991-94 and 1995-98. The country
coverage is determined by the availability of the corruption measure and control variables.
The rm-level data used in this paper is the product of a questionnaire sent to Swedish
MNCs by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (RIIE) in Stockholm, Sweden
about every fourth year since 1960s. The data include all Swedish MNCs in manufacturing
industry and contain detailed information on employment, production, R&D and entry
modes of each majority owned foreign manufacturing a¢ liate. Only the period between
1987 and 1998 is used in this paper due to pronounced changes in the survey questions
over time and the low response rate in the 2003 survey.
The degree of multinationality varies signicantly in the data. More than half of the
rms are single a¢ liate multinationals. An overwhelming majority of rms have foreign
operations in just a few countries. When a new opportunity to serve a host country arises,
this chance may come to a multinational active in another market.
The denitions of cross-border M&As and greeneld investments are taken from the
RIIE survey. The RIIE asks the following four questions to each foreign a¢ liate: (1)
From what year has the a¢ liate been a production company of the group? (2) Was the
a¢ liate a sales company of the group before the year mentioned above? (3) Did the
a¢ liate operate as a production company of another group before the year mentioned
above? (4) Was the a¢ liate a state-owned company before the year mentioned above? If
the answers to last three questions are all negative, then the investment is classied as a
greeneld investment. If the answer to question 3 is a¢ rmative, then the mode of entry
is a cross-border M&A. The frequency of new a¢ liates transformed from sales companies
of the group and the state-owned enterprise acquisitions is low.
Table 1 summarizes the foreign expansion transactions by Swedish MNCs between
1987 and 1998. The numbers of cross-border M&As and greeneld investments as well
as the location of these investments in broad regional categories are reported. When
examining this table, several remarks can be made. First, as can be observed in the
bottom half of Table 1, in each time period foreign entry is small when compared to no
entry, which is true for an overwhelming majority of MNCs around the globe. However,
among the two entry modes the total number of M&As is substantially higher than that
of greeneld investment in all three time periods.
Second, observe the top half of Table 1. An overwhelming majority of investments
are in Western Europe followed by major non-European OECD countries. Both M&As
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and greeneld investments in these two regions are higher than all the other regions
together. The common denominator of all these countries is their level of development.
FDI goes predominantly to advanced countries where corruption is relatively low, even
though the share of developing countries has been rising. Apart from lower corruption
levels, developed countries o¤er a large and growing demand coupled with ease of nding
sub-contractors and distribution channels all of which favor entry.
Third and last, developed countries supply a higher number of high quality acquisition
targets. Table 1 shows that Swedish MNCs have considerably higher M&As in Western
Europe and major non-European OECD countries. The preferred mode of entry in devel-
oping countries is not as clear, however. The share of greeneld investments in all entry
modes (calculated by using the last two columns of the top half of Table 1) in developing
countries is 45%, whereas it is only 18% in developed countries.
4.3 Measuring corruption
In this paper, I use corruption indices constructed from survey responses. Whether per-
ceptions of corruption as enunciated by survey responses indeed reect the reality is a
commonly discussed issue. This paper is partial to the idea that although perceptions
may deviate from reality at the margin, there will not be wide divergences.
There is a plethora of corruption indices made available by di¤erent institutions
through surveys conducted. In this paper, I use two di¤erent corruption indices: One
is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), a long-standing World Bank research
project to develop cross-country indicators of governance and the other one is the Cor-
ruption Perception Index (CPI) annually published by Transparency International (TI).
Both are essentially polls of polls. I rescaled the values between 1 and 100 for comparison
purposes, where higher values indicate higher levels of corruption in the host country.
The more widely known of the two is the CPI which collates results of up to twelve
individual surveys conducted by the World Bank (World Business Environment Survey),
the European Intelligence Unit, the World Economic Forum (Global Competitiveness Re-
port), the Institute of Management Development, Political and Economic Risk Constancy
in Hong Kong, etc. Many of the same sources used by the WGI are used by the CPI as
well, and thus, not surprisingly, the WGI and the CPI are highly correlated.
The WGI consist of six composite indicators of broad dimensions of governance cov-
ering over 200 countries: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism, Government E¤ectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and
Control of Corruption. The advantage of the WGI measure over others is its lesser sus-
ceptibility to poll -or question- specic idiosyncrasies due to its breadth of coverage and
the variety of sources employed in compiling the index. The main sources for the WGI
are polls conducted by various sources such as Standard and Poors DRI (in conjunction
with McGraw-Hill), the Economist Intelligence Unit, Political Risk Services (International
Country Risk Guide), and the World Bank (in conjunction with the University of Basel).
There are of course subtle di¤erences between the questions asked by these sources. Coun-
try coverage is not exactly the same either. However, the survey respondents are divided
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between two groups: (i) business people and/or residents of a country, and (ii) experts
(who are asked to rank countries on various dimensions). A composite index for each
dimension of governance is constructed using these individual surveys through an unob-
served components model.
In this paper, I use the Control of Corruption, CC from the WGI as the main corrup-
tion indicator. It captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture"
of the state by elites and private interests. The CPI is also used as a robustness check.
In the following robustness exercises, I also consider another very relevant dimension of
governance, namely the Rule of Law, RL. It captures perceptions of the extent to which
agents have condence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence.
Table 2 lists all countries included in the sample, the Control of Corruption Index
in 1998, the Corruption Perception Index in 1998, the number of rms producing there
in 1998, and the sum of all Swedish M&As and greeneld investments in the sample
period. Table 2 does not reveal much about the relationship between corruption and
form of FDI. The bottom of table shows many countries with very high corruption levels
and low levels of Swedish entry. The top part shows low corruption levels coupled with
high degrees of M&As and greeneld investments. However, this may simply reect that
Swedish multinationals mainly invest in developed European countries which also have
lower corruption levels.
4.4 Firm characteristics
The model presented in Section 3 is a highly stylized one written to provide a framework
for the empirical analysis. The controls used in the regressions hereafter are inspired both
from this simple model and the broader FDI literature.
Firm-specic skills. As Markusen (2002) points out, multinationals arise from the use
of knowledge capital, a broad term that includes human capital of employees, patents,
blueprints and procedures, which are called rm specic skills.
Multinationals can reduce their production costs through extensive use of these skills
some of which can be provided to additional plants without reducing their value in existing
plants. I use R&D intensity as a proxy for mobile-skills. Mobile is the MNCs total R&D
expenditures divided by total sales at the end of each time period. High-tech rms are
more dependent on their own technology creation and production technology, and as a
result are more likely to enter by greeneld investments. Thus, I expect R&D to a¤ect
greeneld investments positively -pointed out by the theory in Section 3 as well.
Some skills, on the other hand, are location specic and cannot travel across borders.
I proxy these non-mobile skills by previous experience in the host country. Non-mobile is
the number of the previous a¢ liates of the MNC in the host country. Non-mobile carries
information about the local knowledge of the rm that is specic to the host country, such
as distribution networks, connections to local bureaucracy, and knowledge of local business
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culture. Note that Non-mobile may also represent competitive e¤ects of the bargaining
strength. If the MNC already has a¢ liates in the host country, it may not want to hurt
itself by increasing the competition through a new venture and thus may incline more
towards M&As which eliminate rivals. There is a well-established international business
literature drawing attention to the di¤erential impact of this variable on entry modes.
Previous experience increases the local knowledge and connections of the MNC and thus
may foster greeneld investments over cross-border M&As. On the other hand, it may
also promote M&As because experienced MNCs are able to monitor their partners more
e¤ectively. Therefore, the expected sign is positive for both entry strategies yet the
strength of this e¤ect on each entry mode is ambiguous.
Bargaining strength. Market share of the rm is the most widely used bargaining power
measure in the empirical industrial organization literature. There is a lack of data with
broad industry and country coverage for the market share of a multinational in industry
j in country k in time t. The next best alternative is using the market concentration in
industry j in country k in time t. OECD STAN database o¤ers concentration measures
for a limited number of countries and sectors from 1980 to 2000. I used these in my early
regressions without much success due to many missing observations and small sample
sizes.
Starting back with Anderson and Gatignon (1986), in the international business and
management strategy literatures, international experience has been cited as an indicator
of low levels of internal uncertainty and greater condence in business dealings and thus
stronger bargaining positions around the negotiation table. Therefore, in this paper, I
assume that multinationals with more international experience are stronger bargainers.
A¤world is the number of the previous a¢ liates of the MNC all around the world and
represents a broad international experience that fosters FDI by MNCs (Caves, 2007).
The expected sign for this variable for both entry modes is positive. However, I expect
a stronger positive for cross-border M&As since international experience is anticipated
to boost the bargaining strength and thus the probability of M&As. I also use rm
size measured by total employment or sales of the rm as an indicator of the bargaining
strength (results not reported in the paper due to brevity but available upon request),
since larger rms with deep pockets are considered to be more experienced and stronger
bargainers (See Caves, 2007).
4.5 Country characteristics
Guidance from Blonigen and Piger (2011) is followed to motivate the use of country level
controls that are not directly suggested by the model. I include almost all variables with
high inclusion probabilities (above 50 percent) for cross-border M&As reported in their
worldwide sample.8
8Parent level variables such as parent GDP, parent GDP per capita and parent education level are
not included since Sweden is the only parent country and there is no cross-sectional variation in these
variables. In essence, they act as time xed e¤ects and drop out of regressions. Common o¢ cial language,
colonial relationships and contiguous border variables do not work in the regressions due to little variation,
as well.
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Market size (measured by GDP), infrastructure (measured by telephone mainlines
per one million people,Tel), skill level of the labor force in the host country (measured
by the share of university graduates in the population, Skill), trade openness of the
host country (share of trade volume in GDP, Open) and distance (measured by using
the great circle formula that calculates the minimum distance along the surface of the
earth between Sweden and the host country, Distance) are widely used determinants of
entry and are expected to favor both kinds of entry (Brainard (1997), Carr, Markusen
and Maskus (2001)). In addition, host country tax rate (measured by corporate tax rate,
Tax ), double taxation treaties (measured by bilateral tax treaties in e¤ect between Sweden
and the host country, DTT ), bilateral investment treaties (denoted as BIT ) and regional
trade agreement (RTA) dummies are included as suggested by Blonigen and Piger (2011).
GDP per capita is used to account for the availability of acquisition targets in the host
country because it is a broad measure of general level of development. Even though it is
easier to nd sub-contractors and distribution channels in developed countries, which in
fact favors entry, another important issue is that a developed country supplies a bigger
number of more high quality acquisition targets. It is harder to nd suitable acquisi-
tion targets in less developed countries. Therefore, acquisitions are expected to be more
favorable in countries with high GDP/capita.
Direct costs of entry into the host country are not available in the RIIE data set. I
use the o¢ cial time it takes to start-up a new rm in the host country as presented in
Djankov et al. (2002), Time, as proxy for xed entry costs.
The country-level data are collected from the International Financial Statistics of IMF
and the World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank. More information
about variables is provided in Table 3.
5 Results
This section presents the results of econometric analysis in three subsections. Due to
reasons explained in the previous section, rather than a nested qualitative choice model, I
adopt the most general setting where the rm decides if and how to enter a host country
market. Considering the structure of the theoretical model the next best econometric
model is a multivariate probit because it allows a exible pattern of conditional covariance
among the latent utilities of alternatives.
The greatest shortcoming of the multivariate probit model, however, is that the com-
putation of marginal e¤ects is overly complex and do not always yield meaningful esti-
mates as stated in Greene and Hensher (2009). The next alternative is using the bivariate
probit model. Capellari and Jenkins (2003) present a comparison of bivariate probit
(maximum likelihood estimation) to their multivariate probit (simulated maximum likeli-
hood estimation) analysis and come to a conclusion that as long as the number of random
draws and the sample size are large enough, the two methods yield very similar predic-
tions. Since these two conditions are satised in the estimations in this paper, I use
bivariate probit estimation to be able to discuss economic size of the estimates.
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5.1 FDI decision alone
Other than a few exceptions, an overwhelming majority of the existing work on the e¤ects
of corruption on foreign direct investment makes no distinction between the modes of
foreign entry. Therefore, in this subsection I begin with the bivariate probit estimates of
the e¤ects of corruption on both types of FDI by the Swedish multinational corporations
to put the results in perspective with the existing literature.
The rst two columns in Table 4 present the coe¢ cient estimates while the last two
columns report the marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables on the success probability
of each strategy. Marginal e¤ects from the bivariate probit model are obtaind using the
method proposed by Greene (1996) where both direct and indirect partial e¤ects (as
common in models with multiple equations such as this one) are calculated and added at
the means of the explanatory variables. Since the sample size is su¢ ciently large, marginal
e¤ects at means (MEM) and average marginal e¤ects (AME) are similar. Therefore, only
MEMs are reported.9
All regressions in Table 4 include a constant as well as time, industry and RTA xed
e¤ects. Wald 2 is 1462 indicating a good t. Correlation coe¢ cient  is signicant
revealing that fdi and n are not independent from each other as foreign expansion strate-
gies.
Corruption proxied by the Control of Corruption measure from the WGI database is
signicantly negative in equation fdi (column 1) and positive and signicant in equation
n (column 2), revealing that higher levels of corruption in a host country discourage
FDI by Swedish multinationals. This is in line with Hakkala et al. (2008) and Javorcik
and Wei (2009) as well as the previous literature where researchers generally have found
a signicant negative e¤ect of corruption on multinational entry without di¤erentiating
between di¤erent entry modes using aggregate data.
Turning to economic size of the estimated parameters, calculations of marginal e¤ects
show that a small increase in Corruption reduce the probability of FDI by 9.2%. Although
this is not large in absolute magnitude, compared to the probability evaluated at the
sample mean of 2.7% (the success probability of FDI in the sample), this is nevertheless
economically meaningful.
Mobile skills of the multinational increase the likelihood of fdi with a small marginal
e¤ect but reduces the odds for n with a marginal e¤ect of -69.4%. Experience in the host
country (Non-mobile) measured as the number of previous a¢ liates in the host country
has no e¤ect on probability of no entry, however, it increases the likelihood of FDI. The
marginal e¤ect is rather small.
International experience (A¤world), infrastructure (Tel), market size (GDP), labor
skill in the host country (Skill) and double taxation and bilateral investment treaties
(DTT and BIT ) increase the likelihood of FDI as expected while FDI declines in distance
(Distance). Trade openness of the host country (Open), time that its takes to start a new
9No standard error or signicance indicators are given for marginal e¤ects because Greene (2010) argues
that the process of statistical testing about partial e¤ects produces mostly uninformative and sometimes
contradictory and even misleading results.
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business (Time) and corporate tax rate in the host country (Tax ) are not signicant.
5.2 M&As versus greeneld investments
I now turn to the bivariate probit estimates of e¤ects of corruption on new entry by
Swedish multinationals. The rst two columns in Table 5 present the coe¢ cient estimates
whereas the last two columns report the marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables on the
success probability of M&As and greeneld investments. All regressions include a constant
as well as time, industry and RTA xed e¤ects. Wald 2 is 473 indicating a good t.
Correlation coe¢ cient  is signicant revealing that A and G are not independent from
each other as strategies.
Corruption is positive and signicant at 10% in equation m (column 1) and negative
and highly signicant in equation g (column 2), revealing that higher levels of corruption
in the host country may grease the squeaky wheels in case of M&As while discouraging
greeneld investments conducted by Swedish multinationals.
When compared with the recent literature -apart from the fact that none of the recent
studies concentrates on M&As at the rm level- Javorcik and Wei (2009) nd that in
highly corrupt environments, conditional on entry, joint ventures will be the chosen mode
of entry rather than wholly owned subsidiaries. The initial result here is consistent with
their nding.
Calculating the marginal e¤ects shows that an innitesimal increase in Corruption
increases the probability of an M&A by 9.6%. Again, although this seems small in absolute
magnitude, compared to the probability evaluated at the sample mean of 2% (the success
probability of M&As in the sample), this is economically meaningful. The same marginal
e¤ect for a greeneld investment is -16.8%. In other words, a small increase in corruption
reduces the likelihood of a greeneld project by about 17%.
Proposition 1 from the theoretical model presented in Section 3 predicts an inverse
relationship between corruption and greeneld investments and the empirical nding here
conrms it. Proposition 2 points to a nonlinear relationship between corruption and
M&As. The positive and weakly signicant corruption e¤ect on M&As reported in Table
5 is a new result and further investigated in the next subsection.
Swedish MNCs with high Mobile skills favor greeneld investments with a marginal
e¤ect of 10.8%. On the other hand, Non-mobile skills always favors cross-border M&As
with a large marginal e¤ect of only 21.1% and reduces to odds against greeneld invest-
ments, which suggests that Swedish MNCs endowed with stronger connections to local
bureaucracy or knowledge of local business culture prefer cross-border M&As to green-
eld FDI. This may also be interpreted as Swedish MNCs with more bargaining power
derived from their previous experience in the host market acquire local rms rather than
establishing wholly owned subsidiaries.
Turning to other coe¢ cient estimates in the rst two columns of Table 5, international
experience (A¤world) and market size (GDP) increase the likelihood of both kinds of
entry. The host country GDP per capita, the skill level and bilateral investment treaties,
respectively proxied by GDP/capita, Skill and BIT increase the odds in favor of M&As
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only. All of these have relatively small marginal e¤ects on the mode of entry except
for BIT. The existence of a bilateral investment treaty between Sweden and the host
country increases the probability of having an M&A by 12.3%. Trade openness of the
host country (Open), host country infrastructure (Tel), corporate tax rate (Tax ), double
taxation treaties (DTT ) time that its takes to start a new business (Time) are mostly
insignicant for both types of entry.
5.3 More marginal e¤ects
In the previous section, the e¤ect of corruption on greeneld investments is signicant
and negative as expected by the FDI literature. The same variable has quite a di¤erent
e¤ect on cross-border M&As; it is signicant only at 10% nonetheless positive. On the
one hand, it is highly preferable to overtake a local rm with all its knowledge about the
host country conditions particularly in countries with high levels of corruption. On the
other hand, if the MNC is endowed with high levels of mobile skills such as technological
sophistication then a local partner may open the door for leakage of these valuable mobile
skills when corruption is high.
The theoretical model in this paper weighs heavily on such nonlinear interactions.
Interaction terms are used extensively in applied econometrics to account for such non-
linearities. However, in nonlinear models such as the bivariate probit used here, the
magnitude of the interaction e¤ect does not equal the marginal e¤ect of the interaction
term. Therefore, to test Propositions 26 in the model, I estimate changes in marginal
e¤ects for ranges of values (10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles) for Corruption
and evaluate how the marginal e¤ects di¤er across these ranges.
Table 6 shows the marginal e¤ect of Corruption as the corruption level in the host
country changes. The marginal e¤ect estimation is executed using the Greene (1996)
method. For brevity only the corruption terms are reported. The top part of the table
shows the marginal e¤ects at means (MEM) from Table 5 for easier comparison. The
bottom part reports how the marginal e¤ect changes across 5 di¤erent ranges reported in
the table.
Adding strength to Proposition 1, as corruption in the host country increases the
partial e¤ect of corruption on the probability of greeneld investments decline. In other
words, in more corrupt environments Swedish multinationals reduce their greeneld in-
vestments at increasing rates. In the least corrupt host countries (10th percentile) the
marginal e¤ect of corruption on greeneld probability is -4.3% while it reaches almost
-90% in the most corrupt host countries (90th percentile).
The results for M&As are broadly consistent with the predictions of Proposition 2.
The marginal e¤ect is negative in the 10th and 25th percentile ranges while it turns to
positive in the 50th and 75th percentile ranges. In other words, in less corrupt host coun-
tries as corruption increases the likelihood of M&As decline. However, in more corrupt
environments, as corruption increases more M&As are likely. That is to say, in corrupt en-
vironments, a multinational with high non-mobile skills chooses to enter the host country
through an M&A because that way it can employ its own knowledge of that market -if any
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and internalize the local knowledge of the acquired local rm as well. The result obtained
for the 90th percentile is noteworthy because in the most corrupt countries increasing
corruption levels reduce the M&A probability. In other words, as corruption levels pass
a certain threshold the multinationals likelihood of both kinds of entry declines. This
result is in line with Javorcik and Wei (2009).
Next, I investigate the change in the marginal e¤ect ofMobile skills for varying corrup-
tion levels and report the results in Table 7. Propositions 3 and 4 state that multinationals
that are endowed with higher levels of mobile skills are more likely to engage in foreign
direct investment. However, this likelihood is dampened in more corrupt host countries,
particularly for M&As.
The bottom part of Table 7 shows that the negative impact of corruption on green-
eld investments gets stronger with higher levels of mobile skills. In other words, a
multinational with sophisticated technology or novel marketing ideas is a¤ected severely
by corruption. While higher levels of mobile skills increases the likelihood of greeneld
investment by 21.6% in the least corrupt countries, this rate declines to 3.1% in the most
corrupt countries. This result is in line with Proposition 3. The results in Table 7 do not
show strong support for Proposition 4. Mobile skills are not strongly relevant for M&As.
Neither the direct nor the indirect e¤ects are signicant economically.
Finally, I investigate how the usefulness of Non-mobile skills change as level of corrup-
tion changes. Table 8 reports the marginal e¤ect results for non-mobile skills at di¤erent
percentiles of Corruption. Propositions 5 and 6 state that multinationals that are en-
dowed with higher levels of non-mobile skills are more likely to engage in foreign direct
investment. However, this likelihood is higher in more corrupt host countries, particularly
for M&As.
The bottom part of Table 8 presents that Non-mobile skills are almost irrelevant for the
probability of conducting greeneld investments, showing little support for Proposition 5.
On the other hand, Swedish multinationals increase their M&As by 21.1% on average as
their non-mobile skills improve. In the least countries the impact of these skills on M&A
probability is 17.1% while it reaches 75.8% in the most corrupt countries. In other words,
if the multinational has rich knowledge of local conditions through its previous a¢ liates
in the host country then its non-mobile skills get even more useful for this rm. This
result is in line with Proposition 6.
5.4 Robustness
Table 9 reports the marginal e¤ects of Mobile and Non-mobile at di¤erent Corruption
levels using di¤erent measures of corruption. The rst four columns report the results
with widely used CPI of Transparency International. The next four columns present the
results with the Rule of Law measure again from WGI. Results are very similar to the
ones in Tables 7 and 8.
Next, I turn my attention to non-OECD countries as these countries are distinctly
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di¤erent from the bulk of countries that Swedish MNCs mainly invest.10
In Table 10, direct e¤ects of corruption are observed for all entry strategies while
secondary e¤ects realized through mobile and non-mobile skills remain important. One
very notable change in this set of marginal e¤ects is the ip in the sign of Corruption
in the m equation (Column 1) which suggests that higher levels of corruption reduce the
likelihood of M&As in the non-OECD countries. In other words, as corruption levels get
very high, the tolerance of the MNCs even with high levels of non-mobile skills diminishes.
The very nal exercise is restricting the sample to large rms only, although this
limits a lot of the time series variation in the sample. For the purposes of this exercise, a
large rm is dened as a rm with 10 or more a¢ liates around the globe.11 The results
are reported in the last four columns of Table 10. The direct e¤ect of corruption is
smaller in size. Secondary e¤ects are still strong. Multi-a¢ liate MNCs have better and
wider distribution networks around the globe and most importantly more international
experience. Therefore, the M&As and greeneld investments conducted by these rms
might be less prone to changes in corruption. In short, endowment of mobile and non-
mobile skills as well as the degree of multinationality matter for how profound the e¤ect
of corruption will be on the mode of entry.
6 Conclusion
In the last decade, corruption has become an eminent item on the agenda of the in-
ternational institutions. The UN Convention against Corruption, adopted in Mexico in
December 2003 is the rst global instrument embracing a comprehensive range of anti-
corruption measures to be taken at the national level. According to the OECD Convention
of Combating Bribery of Foreign Public O¢ cials in International Business Transactions,
which was signed in 1997, and went into e¤ect in 1999, bribery of foreign o¢ cials by rms
from member countries is a crime. The 15th International Anti-Corruption Conference
(IACC) was completed in November 2012 with record participation from 140 countries
and the main message of the conference was ending impunity.
In this paper, I attempt to disentangle the e¤ects of corruption on entry mode deci-
sion by carrying out an empirical analysis with rich, rm-level data on the activities of
Swedish MNCs around the globe in manufacturing sectors from 1987 to 1998. A number
of propositions emerge from the theoretical framework. As corruption increases multina-
tional entry gets discouraged. Corruption reduces the likelihood of greeneld investments
while increasing the odds in favor of cross-border M&As. MNCs with higher endowments
of mobile skills are more likely to invest in the host country. This likelihood is dampened
the higher the degree of corruption in the host country. On the other hand, MNCs with
10Most of the countries that Swedish MNCs invest are developed countries which also have lower cor-
ruption levels than average country. Swedish MNCs invest in nearby developed countries because they
have lots of potential M&A targets, and these countries just happen to have low levels of corruption
cross-sectionally. Even though there are country-level regressors to control for level of development of a
country in previous estimations, a more compelling experiment is to restrict the sample to these developed
countries only to avoid potentially spurious results. The results are very similar to overall regressions.
11Other thresholds (2 or more and 5 or more) are used in the estimations and the results are similar.
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higher endowments of non-mobile skills are more likely to invest in the host country. This
likelihood is magnied the higher the degree of corruption in the host country.
The panorama of the results presented in the previous section shows the following: (i).
Corruption has a direct negative impact on greeneld investments and a weak positive
impact on M&As. (ii). There are complex, asymmetric, secondary e¤ects of corruption
on the mode of entry. (iii). International experience dampens the e¤ect of corruption on
the mode of entry. (iv). The results are robust to di¤erences in measures of corruption.
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Appendix
Aggregate prot to rms p and h from sales in the host country for entry mode s and quantity
choice xi(s) can be expressed respectively as follows:
p(s; xp(s)) = [(  X(s)  cp(s))xp(s)]  F (s)  F b(s) (A.1)
h(s; xh(s)) = [(  X(s)  ch(s))xh(s)] (A.2)
where X(s) = xp(s) + xh(s). When s = m, xh(s) = 0 and when s = n, xp(s) = 0: Maximizing
(A.1) and (A.2) with respect to xp(s) and xh(s) in that order and solving for xp(s) and xh(s) in
the rst order conditions gives the equilibrium prot levels for each rm as
p(s; xp(s)) = [xp(s)]
2   F (s)  F b(s) (A.3)
h(s; xh(s)) = [xh(s)]
2 (A.4)
where
xp(s) =
  2cp(s) + ch(s)
3
(A.5a)
xh(s) =
  2ch(s) + cp(s)
3
if 2 rms are active (A.5.b)
or
xi(s) =
  2ci(s)
2
if only 1 rm is active (A.6)
where i = (p; hg.
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Table 1: Entry Characteristics of Swedish MNCs by Regions
1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 All periods
m g m g m g m g
Western Europe 107 21 63 16 42 7 212 44
Major Non-European OECD 18 5 9 3 10 2 37 10
Eastern Europe and Russia 0 0 8 8 2 5 10 13
South and Central America 3 0 2 1 6 2 11 3
Asia / Africa 0 0 2 3 8 6 10 9
1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 All periods
Cross-border M&As 128 84 68 280
Greeneld Investments 26 31 22 79
No Entry 4676 5387 3690 13753
Number of Firms 115 131 90 330
Number of Countries 42 42 42 42
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Table 2: The Sample of Countries, 1987-1998
CC CPI No. of
0-100 0-100 rms No. of No. of
Country 1998 1998 1998 m g
Germany
UK
USA
Denmark
Poland
France
Finland
Netherlands
Spain
Italy
6.7
5.4
19.0
2.8
36.7
21.9
2.6
4.6
22.5
39.6
21
13
25
1
54
33
4
10
39
54
28
26
26
25
21
20
18
16
15
15
42
28
29
29
4
16
16
12
9
20
11
4
6
3
10
6
7
0
1
4
Norway
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Austria
China
India
Mexico
Australia
Hungary
Russia
3.6
23.6
50.0
5.2
8.7
55.0
55.7
57.6
14.7
36.9
68.7
10
46
60
8
25
65
71
67
13
50
76
14
14
12
8
8
8
7
6
4
4
4
16
8
6
4
8
3
3
5
3
4
2
3
1
2
3
3
5
1
1
0
1
2
Malaysia
Japan
Czech Republic
Greece
Portugal
Korea
South Africa
Philippines
Ireland
Argentina
38.9
31.4
39.1
28.9
23.3
43.3
37.0
52.9
18.4
53.7
47
42
52
51
35
58
48
67
18
70
4
4
4
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
0
1
0
1
5
2
1
0
2
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
Thailand
Turkey
Colombia
Taiwan
Indonesia
Slovenia
New Zealand
Chile
Venezuela
Iceland
Israel
50.0
61.7
59.0
37.3
71.6
24.0
3.7
22.8
69.1
9.7
24.1
70
66
78
47
80
48
6
32
77
7
29
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Units Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
CC number 36.5 21.4 1.72 82
CPI number 44.4 25.3 0 89
RL number 35.7 19.3 5.09 80
Mobile number 0.021 0.034 0 0.262
Non-mobile number 0.118 0.646 0 14
A¤world number 6.14 15.2 1 125
Time days 32.3 28.50 2 128
GDP in trillions of USD 0.741 1.44 0.008 8.79
GDP/capita in thousands of USD 16.3 11.1 0.426 39.0
Open number 0.611 0.383 0.110 2.93
Tel per one million people 0.378 0.189 0.022 0.684
Distance in thousands of kms 4.66 4.42 0.4 17.0
Skill percentage 2.91 1.25 0.437 6.33
Tax percentage 32.4 6.71 9.8 50
DTT number 0.757 0.429 0 1
BIT number 0.230 0.421 1 1
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Table 4: FDI versus No Entry
Bivariate Probit
Estimates MEM
Entry mode fdi n fdi n
Corruption
-1.06**
(0.542)
1.89***
(0.364)
-0.092 0.412
Mobile
0.163*
(0.976)
-9.314***
(1.122)
0.015 -0.694
Non-mobile
0.093**
(0.044)
0.032
(0.056)
0.011 0.022
A¤world
0.023***
(0.0007)
0.004
(0.035)
0.002 0.003
Time
-0.745*
(0.438)
0.527
(0.671)
0.019 0.018
GDP
0.072***
(0.026)
-0.065***
(0.017)
0.006 -0.021
GDP/capita
0.004
(0.008)
0.042***
(0.006)
0.003 0.015
Open
-0.069
(0.156)
-0.154
(0.102)
-0.006 -0.011
Tel
0.862**
(0.414)
0.939
(0.749)
0.052 0.415
Distance
-0.125**
(0.054)
0.158**
(0.079)
-0.134 0.021
Skill
0.165***
(0.041)
-0.218***
(0.027)
0.018 -0.082
Tax
0.008
(0.022)
0.002
(0.043)
0.021 0.034
DTT
0.562***
(0.187)
-0.128***
(0.045)
0.091 -0.074
BIT
0.236**
(0.127)
-0.078**
(0.042)
0.084 -0.093
Observations 13,258
Wald 2 1462
 -0.858
LR test of 552.5
indep. of eq. (0.000)
Note: Standard errors are in parantheses; ***, **, * denote signi-
cance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; all regressions include
a constant as well as time, industry and RTA xed e¤ects.
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Table 5: MAs versus Greeneld Investments
Bivariate Probit
Estimates MEM
Entry mode m g m g
Corruption
1.48*
(0.813)
-2.14***
(0.728)
0.096 -0.168
Mobile
-1.66
(1.58)
5.96***
(1.53)
-0.013 0.108
Non-mobile
0.106**
(0.043)
-0.138
(0.095)
0.211 -0.003
A¤world
0.018***
(0.004)
0.029***
(0.011)
0.001 0.0004
Time
-0.344
(0.367)
-0.521
(0.507)
-0.028 0.012
GDP
0.064***
(0.029)
0.041*
(0.022)
0.003 0.0005
GDP/capita
0.019**
(0.009)
0.007
(0.016)
0.004 0.0002
Open
-0.165
0.187
0.421*
(0.230)
-0.005 0.007
Tel
1.29*
(0.751)
0.039
(1.28)
0.048 -0.0003
Distance
-0.087*
(0.046)
-0.192**
(0.088)
-0.068 -0.093
Skill
0.241***
(0.073)
0.192
(0.164)
0.028 0.009
Tax
0.008
(0.035)
0.002
(0.064)
0.018 0.012
DTT
0.104
(0.164)
0.092
(0.243)
0.005 0.004
BIT
0.562**
(0.206)
0.036
(0.032)
0.123 0.002
Observations 13,258
Wald 2 473
 -0.592
LR test of 8.79
indep. of eq. (0.01)
Note: Standard errors are in parantheses; ***, **, * denote signi-
cance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; all regressions include
a constant as well as time, industry and RTA xed e¤ects.
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Table 6: The Marginal E¤ect of Corruption
Bivariate Probit
Mergers and Acquisitions
yikt;m = 1 and yikt;g = 0
Greeneld Investment
yikt;m = 0 and yikt;g = 1
MEM
Corruption 0.096 -0.168
Representative Values
Corruption Level
10th percentile -0.023 -0.043
25th percentile -0.052 -0.078
50th percentile 0.084 -0.171
75th percentile 0.121 -0.457
90th percentile -0.073 -0.896
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Table 7: The Marginal E¤ect of Mobile Skills
Bivariate Probit
Mergers and Acquisitions
yikt;m = 1 and yikt;g = 0
Greeneld Investment
yikt;m = 0 and yikt;g = 1
MEM
Corruption 0.096 -0.168
Mobile -0.013 0.108
Representative Values
Corruption Level
10th percentile -0.021 0.216
25th percentile -0.016 0.147
50th percentile -0.017 0.113
75th percentile -0.012 0.082
90th percentile -0.027 0.031
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Table 8: The Marginal E¤ect of Non-mobile Skills
Bivariate Probit
Mergers and Acquisitions
yikt;m = 1 and yikt;g = 0
Greeneld Investment
yikt;m = 0 and yikt;g = 1
MEM
Corruption 0.096 -0.168
Non-mobile 0.211 -0.003
Representative Values
Corruption Level
10th percentile 0.171 -0.007
25th percentile 0.184 -0.004
50th percentile 0.352 0.001
75th percentile 0.582 0.005
90th percentile 0.758 0.009
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Table 9: Robustness, Di¤erent Corruption Measures
Bivariate Probit
CPI Rule of Law
m g m g m g m g
MEM
Corruption 0.078 -0.147 0.078 -0.147 0.098 -0.171 0.098 -0.171
Mobile -0.012 0.095 -0.013 0.108
Non-mobile 0.205 -0.002 0.211 -0.003
Representative Values ME of ME of ME of ME of
Corruption Level Mobile Skills Non-mobile Skills Mobile Skills Non-mobile Skills
10th percentile -0.019 0.204 0.167 -0.006 -0.020 0.217 0.174 -0.008
25th percentile -0.015 0.138 0.174 -0.004 -0.017 0.149 0.191 -0.004
50th percentile -0.017 0.112 0.327 0.002 -0.019 0.117 0.363 0.002
75th percentile -0.011 0.076 0.538 0.006 -0.015 0.089 0.588 0.005
90th percentile -0.025 0.029 0.701 0.008 -0.032 0.036 0.763 0.013
Observation 12,719 13,258
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Table 10: Robustness, Di¤erent Subsamples
Bivariate Probit
Non-OECD Large Firms
m g m g m g m g
MEM
Corruption -0.025 -0.382 0.045 -0.382 0.045 -0.062 0.045 -0.062
Mobile -0.038 0.051 -0.001 0.284
Non-mobile 0.251 0.032 0.391 -0.005
Representative Values ME of ME of ME of ME of
Corruption Level Mobile Skills Non-mobile Skills Mobile Skills Non-mobile Skills
10th percentile -0.051 0.216 0.171 0.009 -0.001 0.473 0.249 -0.007
25th percentile -0.045 0.147 0.184 0.012 -0.002 0.365 0.328 -0.002
50th percentile -0.039 0.113 0.352 0.029 -0.001 0.276 0.371 0.002
75th percentile -0.019 0.082 0.582 0.045 -0.005 0.079 0.565 0.009
90th percentile -0.032 0.031 0.758 0.062 -0.006 0.021 0.674 0.012
Observation 5,434 1,689
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